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NOTES
WAIVERS OF COUNSEL IN JUVENILE COURTS: DO
PROCEDURES GUARD AGAINST INVALID
WAIVERS?
Juveniles charged with serious crimes in Minnesota often waive their right to
counsel. Unfortunately, current procedural safegards do not insure that
juveniles will make knowing and intelligent waivers. This Note examines the
current status of a juvenile's right to counsel in Minnesota, and proposes
changes to guarantee that juveniles will receive adequate representation.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1983, approximately forty-seven percent of the juveniles facing
delinquency charges in Minnesota counties waived their right to be
represented by counsel in juvenile court hearings.l Almost one-half
of the juveniles who were adjudicated delinquent for the felony-level
1. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CENTER, How TODAY'S JUVENILE
JUSTICE TRENDS HAVE AFFECTED PoICY (1984) (copy on file at the William Mitchell
Law Review Office) [hereinafter cited as JUVENILE JUSTICE STUDY]. The study consid-
ered 9,165 petitions from all counties in Minnesota except Hennepin County. Id at
17. Hennepin County handled 3,067 delinquency petitions in 1983, or nearly one-
fourth of the petitions filed in Minnesota that year. Interview with Sherri Korder,
Program Analyst, Hennepin County Office of Planning and Development, in Minne-
1
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offense of burglary waived their right to counsel prior to
adjudication. 2
In Minnesota, a juvenile is considered competent to waive the
right to counsel when charged with a felony-level offense. This as-
sumption is surprising considering that protection is given to adults
charged with equally serious offenses.3 Rule 5 of the Minnesota
Rules of Criminal Prodecure permits adults to waive their right to
counsel with judicial approval.4 The Rule, however, includes a check
on this decision for those charged with gross misdemeanor or felony
offenses. In these cases, even if the defendant waives the right to
counsel and elects to represent himself at trial, counsel shall be ap-
pointed and remain available to assist the defendant.5 The present
Minnesota Rules forJuvenile Court do not include a similar check on
the decision to waive counsel.6
In In re Gault, 7 the United States Supreme Court specifically indi-
cated that prodecures in delinquency proceedings must satisfy the
essentials of due process and fair treatment afforded adults.8 Conse-
apolis (Feb. 27, 1985). The Hennepin County figures were compiled by the Henne-
pin County Juvenile Family Tracking System. Id
2. JUVENILE JUSTICE STUDY, supra note 1, at 17. Burglary is among the most
severe offenses handled in juvenile court. Penalties for a first offense of burglary vary
from forty-hour unpaid work squad dispositions to six months confinement at juve-
nile security facilities. In Hennepin County, the average penalty for burglary of an
unoccupied building is three weeks in the County Home School Beta program. De-
pending upon the specific circumstances of the case, the penalty for burglary of an
occupied dwelling ranges from six weeks to six months. Crimes which pose a danger
or result in harm to people are treated more severely. Interview with Honorable
Allen Oleisky, Judge of Hennepin County Juvenile Court, in Minneapolis (Feb. 26,
1985) [hereinafter cited as Oleisky Interview].
3. MINN. R. CraM. P. 5.02, subd. 1 provides: "If the defendant is not repre-
sented by counsel and is financially unable to afford counsel, the judge or judicial
officer shall appoint counsel for him." Id. (emphasis added). The accompanying com-
ment to the Rule provides:
Under Rule 5.02, subd. 1, counsel must be appointed for a defendant
financially unable to afford counsel in a felony or gross misdemeanor case
even if a defendant exercises his right under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806 (1975), to refuse the assistance of counsel and represent himself. In
such a situation the appointed counsel would remain available for assistance
and consultation if requested by the defendant.
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 5.08, committee comment (1984).
4. MINN. R. CIuM. P. 5.02, subd. 2. Informal rules now in effect in Hennepin
County Juvenile Court require that a juvenile charged with a felony consult with ap-
pointed or privately retained counsel prior to admitting an offense. Oleisky Inter-
view, supra note 2. Because of this rule, few juveniles charged with serious offenses
appear at felony hearings without counsel. Id
5. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 5.02, subd. 2.
6. MINN. R. Juv. CTS. 4.01-.03 (1984).
7. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
8. See id. at 13; see also Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with
Crime: Proposal for a Return to the Not so Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656 (1980).
[Vol. 12
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WAIVERS OF COUNSEL
quently, the state's efforts to protect juveniles against uninformed
waivers of counsel should be as vigorous as its effort to protect
adults.9
Empirical studies highlight the need for stringent procedures to
prevent uninformed waivers of counsel by juveniles.1o These studies
demonstrate that many juveniles fail to understand the privilege
against self-incrimination and the function of defense counsel.II A
juvenile who misunderstands the privilege upon which the right to
counsel is based, or the function of the attorney whose assistance he
rejects, is ill equipped to make an informed, voluntary waiver of
counsel.
The Minnesota Rules forJuvenile Courtl2 and the Minnesota Stat-
utes' 3 provide juveniles charged with crimes the opportunity to se-
cure legal counsel at public expense. The United States Supreme
Court has also held that representation by counsel is an essential ele-
ment of a fair trial.14 For many juveniles, however, this protection is
superficial since the rules and statutes allow them to waive their right
Rosenberg traces developments in juvenile delinquency law from In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967), to Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). For further discussion of
Fare, see infra notes 63, 139. Rosenberg advocates returning to the approach to juve-
nile rights articulated in Gault. Rosenberg, supra at 719.
9. In Gault, the Court discussed the waiver of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation in a custodial setting (an analogous situation). The Court implicitly stated
that a recitation of the Miranda warning (the procedure afforded adults) would not
assure truly voluntary waivers. The Court emphasized the age of the child, the possi-
bility of "adolescent fantasy, fright or despair," the presence and competence of par-
ents, and the assistance of counsel in administering the privilege. Gault, 387 U.S. at
55. "The Gault test for waiver of fifth amendment privilege thus requires painstaking
scrutiny to assure that a child's waiver is roughly equivalent to the voluntary waiver of
an adult charged with a crime." Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 672-73. In Fare, the
Court used the totality of circumstances test applied to adults and refused to institute
special procedures to compensate for the emotional and intellectual inferiority of
juveniles. Fare, 442 U.S. at 725, 728.
10. T. GRisso,JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPE-
TENCE 8-10 (1981); Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 39 (1970) [hereinafter cited as San Diego Study].
11. T. GRisso, supra note 10, at 193-94; see also, San Diego Study, supra note 10, at
54 (concluding that only a small percentage of juveniles are capable of making an
informed, intelligent waiver of Miranda rights).
12. MINN. R.Juv. CTs. 6.01, subd. l(d).
13. MINN. STAT. § 260.155, subd. 2 (1984). The subdivision specifically provides:
"The minor, parent, guardian, or custodian have the right to effective assistance of
counsel. If they desire counsel but are unable to employ it, the court shall appoint
counsel to represent the minor ... in any other case in which it feels that such an
appointment is desirable." Id. The intent of this subdivision is to require the court
to appoint counsel when the child, parent, or guardian desire counsel but are unable
to afford it. Further, it allows the court to appoint counsel for parent, child, or
guardian in any other situation in which it feels this is desirable. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260.155, Interim Commission Comment 1959, subd. 2 (1982).
14. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
1985]
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to counsel. 15
If juveniles in Minnesota are to enjoy the benefits of legal repre-
sentation, certain changes must be made in the current system. This
Note analyzes the procedures in the juvenile justice system, and ad-
vocates that changes must be implemented in order to provide
juveniles with effective procedural safeguards. First, the Note exam-
ines the constitutional basis for the right to counsel. Second, proce-
dural waivers of counsel in Minnesota are considered. After
discussing studies which evaluate juveniles' understanding of their
constitutional rights, the Note evaluates whether the current proce-
dures guarantee constitutionally sound waivers.16 Finally, the Note
suggests certain procedures that would prevent uninformed, in-court
waivers. The suggested procedures include a requirement that
juveniles receive legal representation from the arraignment stage
onward.
I. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Foundation of the Right to Counsel
The right of an accused person to be represented by counsel in
federal court is expressly guaranteed by the sixth amendment of the
United States Constitution.17 In Powell v. Alabama, 18 the Supreme
Court held that the right to counsel is a fundamental right included
within the concept of due process. 19 The Court, however, did not
specifically address the issue of right to counsel in state
proceedings .20
15. MINN. R. Juv. CTS. 15.02, subd. 1; MINN. STAT. § 260.155, subd. 1, 8 (1984).
16. In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Supreme Court stated that a
valid waiver is an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege." Id. at 464.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."Johnson, 304 U.S.
at 462. For an excellent discussion of constitutional development, see generally W.
LAFAvE &J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.1, at 473-81 (1985).
18. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell, seven black men were convicted of rape and
sentenced to death. Id at 49. The defendants were not given the opportunity to
retain counsel nor were they able to consult with family or friends. Id. at 52.
19. The Court stated:
In light of the facts ... the ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their
youth, the imprisonment, and the surveillance of the defendants by the mili-
tary forces, the fact that their friends and families were all in other states and
communication with them necessarily difficult, and above all that they stood
in deadly peril of their lives-we think the failure of the trial court to give
them reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel was a clear denial
of due process.
Id. at 71.
20. The Court limited the holding to fact situations similar to Powell. Id at 73.
[Vol. 12
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The Supreme Court restricted the Powell holding in Betts v. Brady, l
by stating that the fourteenth amendment only requires states to ap-
point counsel in "exceptional circumstances." 22 In 1962, the
Supreme Court retreated from the Betts position.23 The Court held
that "exceptional circumstances" need not be present before the
fourteenth amendment requires states to furnish indigents with
counsel. 24
One year later, in Gideon v. Wainwright,25 the Court overruled
Betts.26 In Gideon, the Supreme Court expressly applied the four-
teenth amendment to states to require counsel in noncapital as well
as capital cases.27 The right to counsel, however, had not yet been
extended to juveniles. 28
B. A Child's Right to Counsel
Four years after the Supreme Court decided Gideo?,, the Court in
Gault, extended the right to appointed counsel to juveniles charged
with delinquency. 29 Gault prompted the Supreme Court's thorough
reevaluation of the parens patriaesO model of juvenile justice.31
21. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). In Betts, the defendant was indicted for robbery. When
the defendant requested counsel, the judge advised him that the county only sup-
plied counsel in murder and rape prosecutions. Id at 457.
22. The Court reasoned that states should be allowed to distinguish between dif-
ferent crimes in deciding whether to appoint counsel. Id at 473. In Betts, the defend-
ant had previous experience with the court system and was of average intelligence.
Id. at 472. Accordingly, his case did not require counsel to protect his constitutional
rights. See id.; see also Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 139 (1947) (refusing to appoint
counsel to assist a defendant making a guilty plea.) The Court stated: "Our duty
does not go beyond safeguarding rights essential to a fair hearing." Id.
23. Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962).
24. In Chewning, the defendant argued that the possibility of legal arguments in
his defense required appointment of counsel. Id at 445. The Supreme Court agreed
holding that the opportunity to develop legal arguments was sufficient to warrant
appointment of counsel. Id.
25. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
26. Id at 345. The Court noted that twenty-two states filed amicus briefs arguing
that Betts was "an anachronism when handed down." Id. at 345.
27. The Supreme Court stated:
[T]he Constitution makes no distinction between capital and noncapital
cases. The Fourteenth Amendment requires due process of the law for de-
prival of 'liberty' just as for deprival of 'life', and there cannot be a differ-
ence in the quality of the process based merely on a supposed difference in
the sanction involved.
Id. at 349.
28. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 41 where the United States Supreme Court extended
the right to counsel to juveniles charged with deliquence.
29. See id.
30. See id. In Gault, a fifteen-year-old boy had been committed to a state indus-
trial school until he reached the age of majority. He was committed after a court
proceeding found him delinquent for making lewd phone calls. l at 7. The maxi-
mum penalty an adult would have received for that offense was a fine of five to fifty
19851
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The juvenile justice movement began as a benevolently motivated
effort to treat juveniles with care.3 2 According to the philosophy of
the movement, juvenile courts were to treat and rehabilitate, rather
than punish.SS These lofty goals were to be achieved free of the bur-
dens of constitutional procedure because juvenile court procedures
were not adversarial.34 Instead of being characterized as the child's
adversary, the state was parens patriae, custodian of the child's person
and property.3 5
The absence of rigid procedure, which was thought to be the prin-
ciple asset of this system, was its principle flaw. The benevolent mo-
tives of the juvenile justice movement proved an inadequate
substitute for principle and procedure.36 The unbridled discretion,
careless investigative procedures, and severe punishment in Gault il-
lustrated the failures of the parens patriae system.3 7 All this was done
in the "interest of the child." The experiment also failed to rehabili-
tate and prevent recidivism.38
The Court in Gault reasoned that benefits enjoyed by juveniles
under the parens patriae model did not outweigh the disadvantages
associated with the denial of due process.3 9 Further, it found that
juvenile courts could protect a child's due process rights without
compromising the substantive benefits of the juvenile system.40 The
benefits included the processing and treatment of juveniles sepa-
rately from adults, avoiding classifying juveniles as criminals, avoid-
ing attaching civil disability to an adjudication of delinquency, and
keeping records confidential.41 Instituting due process procedures
dollars or imprisonment for not more than two months. Id at 29. The juvenile,
however, was committed to state custody for six years. Id.
31. See id. at 16. Parens patriae refers to state intervention to care for those unable
to care for themselves, such as juveniles and incompetents. See id. at 17. The pur-
pose of the doctrine is to protect of the person's interests. Id. The state is consid-
ered the custodian of the child's person and property. Id. at 16.
32. See id.; see also Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 661-64 (discussing Gault's treatment
of the parens patriae doctrine).
33. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 15.
34. Id. at 16.
35. See id. at 17, n.21. A juvenile has the right to be cared for. If his or her
parents do not provide this right, the law must do so. Id.
36. Id. at 16. Under parens patriae, the state may deny the juvenile's procedural
rights under the assertion that juveniles, unlike adults, do not have a right to liberty,
rather, a right to custody. See id. at 17.
37. Id. at 18.
38. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. In Gault, the trial court kept no
record of proceedings and handed down a punishment that was far more severe than
that appropriate for an adult. Id
39. See id. at 22 (citing study conducted by the Stanford Research Institute for the
President's Commission on Crime for the District of Columbia).
40. See id. at 26.
41. See id. at 22-24.
[Vol. 12
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does not compromise these characteristics.42
The Gault Court held that ajuvenile should be afforded fundamen-
tal due process procedures. These procedures included the notice of
charges,43 the right to counsel at trial,44 the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses for the state, and the privilege against self-
incrimination45 Under Gault, these procedures were to be observed
in all adjudications for delinquency where the juvenile risked com-
mitment to a state institution.46 In later decisions, protection against
double jeopardy47 and the "reasonable doubt" standard of proof48
were extended to delinquency proceedings.
II. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND WAIVER OF COUNSEL
IN MINNESOTA
A. Current Status of the Right to Waive Counsel
The Gault requirement that a juvenile be afforded a right to coun-
sel is present in Minnesota.49 Efforts to improve procedures afford-
ing juveniles the right to counsel require an understanding of the
right as it exists in the context of established procedures.
In Minnesota, a juvenile's right to counsel at trial is a personal
constitutional right.50 Only the juvenile may waive the right.51 Par-
42. Id. at 24.
43. Id. at 31-34.
44. See generally id at 34-42.
45. See generally id. at 42-57. See also Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948)
(advising a fifteen-year-old boy of constitutional rights prior to signing a confession
to statements made in five-hour interrogation did not legitimize the confession with-
out benefit of counsel).
46. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.
47. Breed v.Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (doublejeopardy clause prohibits a
state from trying ajuvenile in criminal court as an adult if the juvenile had previously
been subjected to an adjudicatory hearing on the same charge).
48. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (reasonable doubt standard was an
essential element of due process thereby precluded findings of delinquency in juve-
nile cases on the basis of a lesser standard of proof).
49. MINN. STAT. § 260.155, subd. 2 (1984). The right to counsel in Minnesota is
broader than that required by Gault. The Gault holding was limited to the right of
appointed counsel when a delinquent faced incarceration in a state facility. Con-
versely, under the Minnesota procedure, any juvenile charged in a delinquency peti-
tion or cited for a status offense has a right to appointed counsel regardless of the
potential for commitment to a state or local rehabilitative institution. See id.
50. See In re S.W.T., 277 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1979). The Minnesota Supreme
Court held that ajuvenile's parents could not waive the child's right to counsel. Id. at
512-13. Further, the court stated that the juvenile's confessions were inadmissible
because the totality of circumstances indicated that he did not understand his rights
despite nodding in response to questions. ld at 513.
51. See also id. at 512. The court cited Gault for the proposition that the right
"against self-incrimination is as applicable in the case ofjuveniles as it is in respect to
adults." Id However, the validity of a juvenile's waiver is an issue of fact. Id
19851
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ents, guardians, or custodians can neither waive the right for the ju-
venile, nor prevent ajuvenile from exercising the right. 52 A parent's,
guardian's, or custodian's role in the waiver decision is only one of
the factors to be considered in determining whether the waiver was
valid.53
The Minnesota Rules for Juvenile Court insure that all juveniles
who wish to be represented by counsel have that opportunity.54 A
juvenile who appears in court on a delinquency petition without an
attorney must be advised of his right to counsel at or before the
hearing.55 The juvenile is also informed that if he cannot afford
counsel, a lawyer will be provided for him.56 In a majority of cases, a
juvenile who requests legal representation cannot afford to obtain
private counsel.57 Thus, counsel must be appointed by the court at
public expense.
After being advised of the right to counsel, a juvenile may waive
that right.58 The waiver, however, is valid only if it is knowingly and
voluntarily made.59 In order to determine whether a waiver is know-
ing and voluntary, the court looks at the "totality of the circum-
stances." 60 The circumstances in the analysis include the presence
and competence of the juvenile's parents, guardian, or guardian ad
litem, as well as the juvenile's age, maturity, intelligence, education,
52. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text; Id. but see MINN. STAT.
§ 260.155, subd. 8 (1984) (requiring that parents execute waivers for children under
12 years of age).
53. MINN. R. Juv. CTS. 15.02, subd. 1.
54. Id 4.01; see id. 15.02, subd. 1 (governing the waiver of counsel by juveniles).
55. Id. 4.01, subd. 2. This rule applies to any petition requiring the child to ap-
pear at a hearing.
56. Id. 4.01, subd. 3(A).
57. Fine, Out of Home Placement of Children in Minnesota: A Research Report, MINN.
H.R. RESEARCH REPORT (June 1983) at 48 (copy on file at the William Mitchell Law
Review office).
58. Rule 15.02 of Minnesota Rules for Juvenile Courts provides:
After being advised of the right to counsel, pursuant to Rule 4, a child may
waive the right to counsel only if the waiver is voluntarily and intelligendy
made. In determining whether a child has voluntarily and intelligently
waived the right to counsel the court shall look at the totality of the circum-
stances. These circumstances include but are not limited to: the presence
and competence of the child's parent(s), guardian or guardian ad litem, and
child's age, maturity, intelligence, education, experience and ability to
comprehend.
MINN. R. Juv. CT. 15.02.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., In re M.D.S., 345 N.W.2d 723, 731-32 (Minn. 1984) (applying totality
of circumstances test to decide whether juvenile's waiver was knowing and intelli-
gent); In re L.R.B., 373 N.W.2d 334, 337-38 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (discussing state's
burden of proof that juvenile's waiver of right to counsel was knowing and intelligent
under the totality of circumstances test).
[Vol. 12
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experience, and ability to comprehend.61 Once ajuvenile has waived
the right to counsel, he must be readvised of his right by the court at
the beginning of each hearing.62
The Minnesota Rules for Juvenile Court, outline the waiver proce-
dure.63 The waiver question is first addressed during arraignment.64
Even if a juvenile waives counsel and denies the charge, the waiver
issue will arise again before the start of the trial.65 In contrast, if a
juvenile waives counsel and admits to the charge, then the court will
61. The totality of the circumstances test has been used to evaluate waivers of
constitutional rights by children for more than ten years in Minnesota. See, e.g., State
v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Minn. 1980); S.W. T., 277 N.W.2d at 513; State v.
Hogan, 297 Minn. 430, 440, 212 N.W.2d 664, 671 (1973); State v. Loyd, 297 Minn.
442, 451, 212 N.W.2d 671, 678 (1973). The United States Supreme Court has also
demonstrated its approval of the case-by-case approach evaluating the validity of
waivers of constitutional rights by children. Fare, 442 U.S. at 725.
In Fare, the respondent argued that a child's request to see his probation officer
during custodial interrogation is the functional equivalent of an adult's request to
consult with an attorney. See id. at 711-12. The rationale behind this position was
that the probation officer was a person the juvenile trusted and a person to whom the
juvenile would naturally turn when apprehended by police. Id. at 713. A child unfa-
miliar with a lawyer would be much less likely to request the assistance of a stranger.
Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966), the child's request to speak
with a probation officer is the functional equivalent of a request to speak with an
attorney. A request of this type would prohibit further questioning unless it was initi-
ated by the child. Fare, 442 U.S-. at 713. The child's argument was an attempt to gain
additional protection for children in waiver settings; protections that would compen-
sate for the child's incapacity to understand the choices presented to him. Id
In Fare, the Supreme Court ruled against the child. Id. at 728. The Court ap-
proved of the case-by-case totality of circumstances approach:
This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine
whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is
involved. We discern no persuasive reasons why any other approach is re-
quired where the question is whether a juvenile has waived his rights, as
opposed to whether an adult has done so. The totality approach permits-
indeed, it mandates-inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation.
Id. at 725.
62. The Minnesota Rules for Juvenile Court provide: "After a child waives the
ight to counsel the child shall be advised of the right to counsel by the court on the
record, at the beginning of each hearing at which the child is not represented by
counsel. MINN. R. Juv. CTS. 15.02, subd. 2.
63. Id 15.01. The procedure for the evaluation of waivers during interrogation
is beyond the scope of this discussion. See generally Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice:
Rules of Procedures for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 169-90 (1984).
64. MINN. R. JUv. CTs 4.01, subd 2. The subdivision states that, "A child not
represented by counsel shall be advised orally by counsel, who shall not be the
County Attorney, or orally by the court on the record of the right to counsel at or
before any hearing on a petition." Id
65. See id 15.02, subd. 2. After the juvenile waives counsel, he will be advised of
the right to counsel by the court on the record at the beginning of each hearing. See
supra note 62 and accompanying text.
1985]
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enter a finding and make a disposition.66 A juvenile who waives
counsel at arraignment or immediately preceeding trial must make
the decision without the advice of counsel. In both cases, once the
waiver is made and a finding is entered, it is unlikely that the issue
will come to the attention of the defense counsel. Thus, an in-court
waiver contains no subsequent check on the juvenile's decision.
6 7
The juvenile, his parents, the county attorney, and the judge or
referee are present during the waiver evaluation.68 The rules, how-
ever, do not require that anyone advise the juvenile of the conse-
quences of his decision.6 9 Furthermore, the judge must evaluate the
juvenile's waiver under the totality of circumstances test with little
information regarding his background. The judge's decision is
based on a short conversation with the juvenile and his parents.
70
Unfortunately, a person familiar with both the juvenile's background
and factors relevant to the validity of the waiver is not present.T Be-
cause the juvenile makes this waiver without benefit of counsel, and
since there is no formal check on the waiver decision,72 the compe-
tence of the juvenile and his parents becomes critically important.
B. An Analysis of the Problem
A recent study by the Minnesota State Planning Agency7 S casts
doubt on the competence of juveniles to make the decision to waive
counsel. The study indicates that a surprising number of juveniles
charged with delinquency in Minnesota juvenile courts waived their
right to counsel.74 Twenty percent of all juveniles whom the state
66. MINN. R. Juv. CTS. 30.01.
67. Id. 21.03, subd. 5. The court must make a decision whether or not to accept
an admission within fifteen days of the admission. The rules do not require that an
attorney representing the child's interests review the admission. The only time in-
court waivers of counsel are later challenged is at the disposition stage of the pro-
ceedings. If the child feels that the punishment is too harsh he may, with the benefit
of counsel, attempt to show that his waiver of counsel was invalid. This result occurs
on a frequent basis. Oleisky Interview, supra note 2.
68. MINN. R. Juv. CTs. 3.01-.03.
69. In Hennepin County, an informal court rule requires that a juvenile charged
with a felony consult with an attorney prior to waiving counsel. Oleisky Interview,
supra note 2.
70. Id
71. See MINN. R.Juv. CTS. 15.02. The factors that must be analyzed are the juve-
nile's age, intelligence, maturity, experience, ability to comprehend, as well as the
competence of the parents. Id.
72. The checks on this procedure are the advising of rights prior to an admission,
MINN. R. Juv. CTS. 21.03, and the child's ability to withdraw his admission if it would
result in manifest injustice or for any other fair and just reason. Id. at subd. 3. This
issue generally arises after the disposition stage when the child feels his punishment
was too harsh. Oleisky Interview, supra note 2.
73. JUVENILE JUSTICE STUDY, supra note 1.
74. Id at 17.
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moved to refer to district court for trial as adults waived their right to
counsel at the reference hearing.75 The consequences faced by a ju-
venile in a reference hearing are comparable to the most severe con-
sequences faced by an adult in district court. 76 A juvenile in this
situation has usually committed a felony-level offense, has a history
of prior contacts with juvenile court, and is thought to be unsuitable
for treatment in the juvenile court system.
77
The issues litigated in a reference hearing are also very complex.
Expert testimony may be introduced on a juvenile's suitability for
treatment in institutions under juvenile court jurisdiction.T8 In light
of the severe consequences facing a juvenile and the complexity of
the issues litigated, no juvenile should enter a reference hearing
lacking competent counsel.
79
Twenty-eight percent of all juveniles who risked placement in state
or local correctional facilities appeared at their delinquency hearing
after waiving their right to counsel.8 0 In addition, forty-five percent
of all juveniles charged with burglarly and appearing on delinquency
petitions did so after waiving their right to representation.8 1 Ajuve-
nile guilty of burglary is frequently committed to a state or local
institution.82
The study also found that forty-eight percent of all juveniles ap-
pearing at hearings on delinquency petitions did so without repre-
75. Id. at 18. This large figure may be explained in part by certain practices in
rural counties. In rural counties, juveniles are frequendy referred on drinking re-
lated traffic offenses and for "deer shining." Oleisky Interview, supra note 2. In Hen-
nepin County, no child is permitted to proceed in a reference hearing without
counsel. Id
76. The reference hearing is a "critically important" proceeding. Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). In Kent, the Supreme Court held that prodecural
regularity sufficient to satisfy due process was required where the court decides the
"critically important" question of whether a child will be referred to adult court and
will be deprived of the protections of juvenile court. Id.
77. MINN. STAT. § 260.125 (1984). See also In reJ.F.K., 316 N.W.2d 563 (Minn.
1982) (state need not prove that juvenile is unamenable to treatment in juvenile
court system when public safety considerations override); In re J.R.D., 342 N.W.2d
162 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (applying factors necessary to move a juvenile to adult
court).
78. See Feld, supra note 63, at 167.
79. This contention is supported by Hennepin County Juvenile Court Policy.
Oleisky Interview, supra note 2.
80. JUVENILE JUSTICE STUDY, supra note 1, at 18.
81. Id.
82. A finding that a child has committed burglary will have severe consequences
even where the child is not institutionalized. It would increase the penalties for sub-
sequent findings of delinquency. Id. The finding of burglary would also increase
penalties for crimes committed after the child becomes an adult. The Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines provide:
The offender is assigned one criminal history point for every two offenses
1985]
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sentation.8 3 Sixty-eight percent of those appearing on citations or
petitions for status offenses did so without an attorney.8 4
Each juvenile who waived the right to counsel was in the presence
of a judge or referee. The waiver was made on the record.8 5 The
judge examined the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether the juvenile was mature enough to understand the impor-
tance of the decision.86
These alarming statistics raise two questions. The most obvious
question is whether juveniles waiving their right to counsel under-
stand the ramifications of their decisions. Statistics also raise the
question of whether the totality of circumstances test is an adequate
check on an uniformed waiver of counsel. In response to the latter
question, the United States Supreme Court,87 the Minnesota
Supreme Court,88 and the Minnesota Legislature89 endorse the "to-
tality" approach as an effective method to reveal those waivers of
counsel that are not knowingly and voluntarily made. As to the for-
mer question of whether juveniles are competent to understand the
function of legal counsel and the serious consequences of their deci-
committed and prosecuted as a juvenile that would have been felonies if
committed by an adult, provided that:
a. Findings were made by the juvenile court pursuant to an admission
in court or after trial;
b. Each offense represented a separate behavioral incident or involved
separate victims in a single behavioral incident;
c. The juvenile offenses occurred after the offender's sixteenth birth-
day;
d. The offender had not attained the age of twenty-one at the time the
felony was committed for which he or she is currently sentenced; and
e. No offender may receive more than one point for offenses commit-
ted and prosecuted as a juvenile.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 app. 11 (B) (4) (West 1984).
83. JUVENILE JUSTICE STUDY, supra note 1.
84. Id. This statistic may be dismissed at first because of the relative severity of
status offenses. However, a House Research report by Kerry Fine, Legislative Ana-
lyst, discovered that large numbers of status offenders are also taken into custody by
the state. Fine, supra note 57, at 53. The institutionalizing of status offenders is ex-
plained, in part, by the fact that many of the offenders are juveniles who have run
away or have absented from juvenile court placements. Oleisky Interview, supra note
2. In addition, the status offenses of truancy, incorrigibility, and absenting frequently
indicate problems of neglect in the family. Out-of-home placements for juveniles
cited for other offenses is a response to inadequate family support. ld
85. MINN. R. Juv. CTs. 15.
86. Id.
87. Fare, 442 U.S. 707 at 725.
88. See, e.g., Hogan, 297 Minn. at 440, 212 N.W.2d at 671 (listing factors to be
considered when deciding whether a juvenile's waiver is voluntarily and intelligently
made).
89. MINN. STAT. § 260.155, subd. 8 (permitting express intelligent waiver of
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sion to waive counsel, there is cause for concern. 90
III. JUVENILE COMPETENCE
A. Legal Competence v. Actual Competence
It is beyond dispute that juveniles are legally capable of waiving
their sixth amendment right to counsel at trial.9i The Supreme
Court established this principle in Gault9 2 by applying the proce-
dural safeguards set forth in Miranda v. Arizona9 3 to juveniles. Aju-
venile's intellectual competence to waive constitutional rights,
however, is less clear. The test for a valid waiver of a constitutionally
protected right by an adult orjuvenile is whether it is an "intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
94
The Court recognized there is a minimum level of understanding
"below which a free and voluntary waiver cannot be said to be an
intelligent relinquishment of a known right."95 An effective waiver
assumes a lack of ignorance, intimidation, and fear.96 The question
of whether juveniles charged with delinquency are intellectually
competent to waive their constitutional rights has been the focus of
numerous scholarly discussions. 9 7
90. See generally infra notes 91-132 and accompanying text.
91. Cf Fare, 442 U.S. at 725 (totality of the circumstances test is sufficient to
determine the validity of the defendant's waiver of his fifth and sixth amendment
rights).
92. See supra notes 29-46 and accompanying text.
93. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
94. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (1938).
A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege. The determination of whether there has been an
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon
the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.
Id.
95. San Diego Study, supra note 10, at 53. The San Diego Study awarded the
juveniles in the study points for various levels of understanding of constitutional
rights. See text and accompanying notes 108-10. The study found that a small per-
centage of subjects had full conscious understanding of the Miranda warning. See
infra note 112. A large percentage of the children did not possess the "quantum of
understanding" necessary to render a valid waiver. San Diego Study, supra note 10, at
54.
96. See generally Note, Waiver of Constitutional Rights by Minors: A Question of Law or
Fact?, 19 HAST. LJ. 223 (1967). This Note discusses whether the validity of a child's
waiver of constitutional rights should be a question of fact or a question of law. If it
is a question of fact, the court would consider each case under a totality of the cir-
cumstances evaluation. If a question of law, waivers by minors would be invalid per
se based on the belief that children are not competent to make such a decision. The
Note concludes that a judicial rule nullifying all juvenile waivers of constitutional
rights is perhaps essential to the preservation of minors' constitutional rights. Id. at
231.
97. See generally T. Gmisso, supra note 10; Bailey & Soderling, Born to Lose--Waiver
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These discussions focus on the juvenile's waiver of rights at the
time of interrogation.98 Many of these commentaries, however,
reach conclusions on juvenile competence relevant to this discus-
sion. When rights are waived during interrogation, the voluntariness
of the waiver and the juvenile's understanding of his rights are sus-
pect. 99 However, in the case of an in-court waiver, the coercive envi-
ronment characteristic of interrogation is largely absent.'00
Therefore, the only question remaining is thejuvenile's ability to un-
derstand the rights waived.
Commentators generally agree that the majority of juveniles
processed through the judicial system should be legally competent
before making a truly knowing and intelligent waiver of their
rights.1O1 The rationale behind this conclusion is that juveniles are
"generally regarded as unable to enter legal transactions and are
presumed to lack the requisite intelligence to make a valid
waiver."102 Thus, juveniles are considered legally incompetent in
most civil matters. For example, they cannot vote,103 cannot enter
into a binding contract,104 cannot make a valid will,105 and cannot
marry without parental consent. 106 Based on their inability to un-
derstand the ramifications of their actions, juveniles would be legally
incapable of executing a valid waiver.10 7
of Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights By Juvenile Suspects, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 127
(1981); San Diego Study, supra note 10, at 39.
98. See supra note 97.
99. See generally Bailey & Soderling, supra note 97, at 128.
100. A juvenile advised of his rights in court is not free of intimidating forces.
The formal courtroom environment, the parents' desire to conclude the matter, and
the possible impatience of the judge or referee advising the juvenile to obtain coun-
sel can all work to cause a juvenile to choose the most expedient course of action.
One study concluded that our society does not provide adequate models for refusing
to comply with an authority figure even when compliance is against our better judg-
ment. Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, 18 HUM. REL.
57, 67 (1965).
101. See supra note 83; see also Feld, supra note 63, at 169-90; Rafkey & Sealey, The
Adolescent and the Law: A Survey, 21 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 131, 138 (1975) (conclud-
ing that "youth have only a mediocre knowledge of their own rights").
102. Note,Juvenile Confessions: Whether State Procedures Ensure Constitutionally Permissi-
ble Confessions, 67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 195, 201 (1976).
103. MINN. STAT. § 201.014 (1984) (voting age in Minnesota is 18 years or older).
104. Id. § 336.3-305 (minors may rescind a contract at will); see also Conrad v.
Lane, 26 Minn. 389, 390, 4 N.W. 695, 696 (1880) (minors unable to bind themselves
to a contract by reason of their immaturity and inexperience); infra note 152 and
accompanying text.
105. MINN. STAT. § 524.2-501 (1984).
106. Id. § 517.02 (1984).
107. See Note, supra note 102, at 201.
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B. Statistical Studies ofJuvenile Competence
1. The San Diego Study
Two commentators have conducted studies to test juveniles' abil-
ity to understand the concepts underlying the constitutional privi-
lege against self-incrimination, and the right to counsel.108 One
study was conducted in San Diego in response to a recommendation
that police give the Miranda'09 warning in terms that reflect the lan-
guage and experience of today's juveniles. 1o The study drafted and
tested a modified warning which was more easily understood by
juveniles. The purpose of the study was to measure juveniles' sub-
jective understanding of the elements of the Miranda warning.",1
The San Diego study was based upon a sample of ninety juveniles.
In addition, one-half of the juveniles in the study had been adjudi-
cated delinquent. Fifty percent of the juveniles were given the sim-
plified warning 112 and the remainder were given the formal Miranda
warning. The results indicated that ninety-six percent failed to fully
understandt13 the Miranda warnings although they had voluntarily
waived their rights. Furthermore, the juveniles showed no apprecia-
ble increased understanding of the simplified version. The right to
108. See generally San Diego Study, supra note 10, at 44. For a discussion of the
Thomas Grisso study, see infra notes 115-32 and accompanying text.
109. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
110. San Diego Study, supra note 10, at 44.
111. The elements of the warning are:
(1) the right to remain silent;
(2) the right to an attorney;
(3) the right to an attorney before interrogation;
(4) the appointment of an attorney if unable to afford.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 472-74.
112. The simplified warning, devised for the purpose of the study, contained the
following:
You don't have to talk to me at all, now or later on, it is up to you.
If you decide to talk to me, I can go to court and repeat what you say,
against you.
. If you want a lawyer, an attorney, to help you to decide what to do, you
can have one free before and during questioning by me now or by anyone
else later on.
Do you want me to explain or repeat anything about what I have just
told you?
Remembering what I've just told you, do you want to talk to me?
San Diego Study, supra note 10, at 40.
113. Of 90 fourteen-year-olds surveyed, 86 waived their rights. Id. at 53. Of the
86, only five fully understood either the simplified or the formal warning. Id For
each of the five elements a score of two was awarded for conscious understanding
(ability to repeat and explain concept). A score of one was awarded for latent under-
standing. Latent understanding was indicated by a child's ability to correctly answer
a question about an element of the warning (i.e., Did I say when you could have an
attorney or a lawyer?). Id at 43. A score of ten indicated full conscious understand-
ing. Id. at 54.
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counsel before and during questioning was the least understood ele-
ment by all juveniles.114
2. The Grisso Study
A study by Thomas Grisso115 is the most thorough study of
juveniles' competence to waive constitutional rights. A portion of
the study focused on the distinction between a juvenile's knowledge
of a given right and his ability to understand the function of the
right.116 Grisso also performed two studies relevant to in-court
waivers of counsel. One evaluated a juvenile's understanding of the
right to counsel.17T The other study evaluated a juvenile's under-
standing of the privilege against self-incrimination.,18
The first of these studies proposed that knowledge of the right to
counsel was of little consequence unless accompanied by an under-
standing of an attorney's role.1 9 The juvenile must understand that
an attorney is his defender, a person who will offer friendly legal ad-
vice, and even argue for the least restrictive penalty if the juvenile is
found guilty.120 The second study was based on a belief that ajuve-
nile who knew about the privilege against self-incrimination would
be unlikely to exercise it unless he understood that the privilege was
absolute.121 Ajuvenile who knew that an offense had been commit-
ted would find little use for an attorney if he believed that a judge
could force him to confess by revoking the privilege against self-
incrimination. 122
The Grisso studies reached three major conclusions relevant to
this discussion. First, Grisso concluded that juveniles were signifi-
cantly less aware of the importance of their rights in the context of
114. Id.
115. See generally T. GRIsso, supra note 10, at 110. The Grisso study was based on
a group of 160 juvenile offenders who had been detained after arrest. They were
questioned between 24 hours and 72 hours after arrest. The group also included 39
juveniles who had been incarcerated in juvenile rehabilitation facilities. The adults in
the study included 203 offenders and 57 non-offenders. Id at 111. The study did
not assess most of the children's level of competence at the stage where they would
make in-court waivers of counsel. Nevertheless, the study approximates a child's
level of understanding at those later stages. Id. at 111. The juveniles affected by in-
court waiver provisions appear at arraignment without counsel and have seldom had
benefit of counsel between arrest and arraignment. Oleisky Interview, supra note 2.
116. See generally T. Giusso, supra note 10, at 107-28. A juvenile who knows that
he has the right to counsel may not understand the benefit to be derived from the aid
of counsel. Id. at 109.
117. See id. at 115.
118. See id. at 120.
119. Id. at 111.
120. Id at 115.
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legal proceedings than were adults.123 This conclusion was true of
all juveniles age ten through sixteen and was particularly true of
juveniles with IQ scores below ninety.124 The exception to this con-
clusion was found among juveniles who had been referred to court
on felony charges on three or more occasions.125 This "exper-
ienced" group ofjuveniles exhibited a higher level of understanding
of their rights than did others in the study. The level was equivalent
to that exhibited by adult non-offenders.126
Second, the study on juveniles' understanding of their right to
counsel concluded that nearly one-third of the juveniles with either
few felony referrals or no referrals believed that defense attorneys
will represent the interests of only the innocent.12 7 Waiver of the
right to counsel by a juvenile with this misconception falls short of
the standard for a valid waiver.' 28 Finally, the study on the privilege
against self-incrimination concluded that most juveniles fail to un-
derstand the legal protection behind that privilege.129 Many
juveniles even believed that the judge could revoke the right to si-
lence during any appearance in court.'30 A majority of the juveniles
in this study believed that a defendant who had chosen to remain
silent would also have to discuss the alleged offense if the judge or-
dered him to do so.iS1 This belief was held by the subjects regard-
less of their age, IQ or race.13 2
123. Id at 128. The Grisso study concluded thatjuveniles age fourteen and below
are incompetent to waive their rights to silence and legal counsel. This conclusion is
supported by measures of understanding and perception in relation to normative
adult standards. Id. at 193. Juveniles age fifteen and sixteen who have an IQbelow
80 lack the necessary competence to waive their ights to silence or counsel. Id.
Moreover, approximately one-third to one-half of fifteen and sixteen-year-olds with
IQs above 80 lack competence to waive their rights when competence is defined by
absolute standards. However, this group demonstrates a level of understanding simi-
lar to seventeen to twenty-one-year old adults who are presumed competent to waive
their rights. Id at 193-94.
124. Id at 128. Adults with IQs below 90 were far more knowledgeable about the
attorney-client relationship and the function of the right to silence than were
juveniles possessing this IQlevel. Id Most children referred to juvenile courts mani-
fest this subaverage level of intellectual functioning. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 129.
128. See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464.
129. T. GRIsso, supra note 10, at 129. The study also found that nearly three-
quarters of the adult nonoffenders failed to understand the privilege against self-
incrimination. Id at 130.
130. See id. at 129.
131. Id at 124.
132. Id In addition, a majority of adult nonoffenders also held the same belief. Id.
Many adults and juveniles believed that the judge makes the law and has the power to
assess penalties for those who do not comply with it. See id. Several juveniles felt that
the sole purpose of the hearing was to obtain a confession. For this reason, those
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IV. EVALUATING A CHILD'S WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
An evaluation of the procedures by which juveniles in Minnesota
accomplish in-court waiver of their right to counsel and the studies
on juvenile competence raise two quesitons. First, should a juvenile
in Minnesota be permitted to forego his right to be represented by
an attorney at arraignment and throughout trial? If so, is the totality
of circumstances test sufficiently structured to allow a searching in-
quiry into a juvenile's ability to understand the ramifications of his
decision?
The Grisso study and the San Diego studyi3s both illustrate the
inability of juveniles to understand the role of legal counsel, and the
privilege against self-incrimination. The right to counsel is of little
value to a juvenile who believes that defense lawyers only help the
innocent.13 4 A juvenile under this misconception who believes he is
guilty is likely to waive his right to counsel. In this situation, the
waiver would not be valid because the juvenile lacks full understand-
ing of the protections counsel could provide. The right to counsel is
also of little value to juveniles believing that the privilege against
self-incrimination can be revoked by ajudge.135 If the juvenile knew
that he committed the offense and believed that the judge could
force a confession, then the juvenile would also believe that an attor-
ney's role in the process was dubious.
If juveniles harbor these misconceptions, then they are incompe-
tent to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of their right to be
represented by counsel at arraignment or at trial. If the proposition
that juveniles are per se incompetent to waive their right to counsel
is rejected, 136 then the totality of circumstances test must be reevalu-
ated. The United States Supreme Court13 7 and the Minnesota
Supreme Court1S8 believe that the "totality" approach is an effective
same juveniles thought that asserting the right to silence would be unlawful. Id.
Many also thought that refusal to talk about illegal activities would amount to per-
jury. As one put it, "If I'm in court, I have to tell the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth. So when the judge asks what you done, you got to tell him
even if you don't want to." Id.
133. T. GRisso, supra note 10, at 125.
134. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
135. See T. Gvisso, supra note 10, at 129.
136. Id.
137. Courts have rejected the proposition that children are per se incompetent to
waive their right to counsel. See, e.g., Fare, 442 U.S. at 707 (discussing the waiver of
constitutional rights during interrogation); McLemore v. Cubley, 569 F.2d 940, 944
(5th Cir. 1978) (rejecting the argument that prior advice and assistance of counsel
was constitutionally required before a juvenile can intelligently and competently
waive his right to counsel); People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 368, 432 P.2d 202, 205, 62
Cal. Rptr. 586, 590 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 945 (1968) (applying the totality of
the circumstances test of which age is only one important factor).
138. See, e.g., State v. Under, 268 N.W.2d 734, 736 (1978) (applying the totality of
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method to reveal waivers of rights that are not knowingly and volun-
tarily made. Despite this assumption, a careful analysis of the "total-
ity" approach reveals that it is a very loosely structured method of
evaluating a juvenile's competence.13 9
The totality test currently used in Minnesota to evaluate in-court
waivers of counsel provides the trial court little guidance in adminis-
tering the test.140 Rule 15 of the Rules for Juvenile Court includes a
list of seven non-exclusive factors.141 The Rule, however, does not
specify the weight afforded the various factors. As a result, it is diffi-
cult for a judge to evaluate a juvenile's waiver according to these
factors. Furthermore, the Grisso study found that judges often apply
the variables without empirical knowledge of the ways in which cer-
tain characteristics of juveniles influence their ability to make a
knowing and intelligent waiver. 142 Even when a judge possesses em-
pirical data, he would not, in most cases, have sufficient information
on the juvenile's background during arraignment, or prior to a pro
se trial, to know whether the juvenile possessed those characteristics.
Some courts have examined intelligence test scores to answer this
question. Courts, however, have done so without a thorough under-
standing of the relationship between the validity of the waiver and
the intelligence of a given juvenile.143
The current "totality" evaluation is not a satisfactory check on in-
valid in-court waivers. Traditionally, the totality of the circum-
stances test has been employed when courts retrospectively evaluate
the waiver of a constitutional right.144 In this context, the court has
the benefit of information presented by counsel for the state and for
circumstances test to evaluate waiver of Miranda rights); Hogan, 297 Minn. at 430, 212
N.W.2d at 664 (applying the totality of the circumstances test set forth in Gault and
rejecting an absolute rule that every minor is incompetent as a matter of law to waive
constitutional rights); City of St. Paul v. Hitzmann, 295 Minn. 301, 305, 204 N.W.2d
417, 420 (1973) (juveniles are only entitled to the same rights afforded to other
juveniles in similar circumstances).
139. T. Gmisso, supra note 10, at 8; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION INSTITUTE OF JU-
DIcIAL ADMINISTRATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT: STANDARDS RELATING
TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 92 (1980). "The 'totality' test by which most
courts judge the validity of waivers is difficult to administer, and invites uncertainty at
all stages of the proceedings." Id (cited in R. Lawrence, The Role of Legal Counsel in
Juvenile's Understanding of Their Rights, Juv. & FAm. CT. J. Winter 1983-84, at 49-50).
140. See T. GRisso, supra note 10, at 8 (discussing the problems of applying the
variables of the totality of the circumstances test).
141. MINN. R. Juv. CTS. 15. "These circumstances include but are not limited to
the presence and competence of the child's parent(s), guardian or guardian ad litem,
the child's age, maturity, intelligence, education, experience, and ability to compre-
hend." Id. at 15.02.
142. T. GRIsso, supra note 10, at 8.
143. Id.
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the defendant. The adversarial process enables the court to make an
informed decision.
The "totality" evaluation of in-court waivers, however, is quite dif-
ferent. In this context, the court looks at a totality of circumstances
to decide whether a juvenile who waives his right to counsel is doing
so knowingly and voluntarily.145 Individuals who are familiar with
both the juvenile's background and the factors relevant to the valid-
ity of the juvenile's waiver are absent from this procedure. The court
lacks the information it would gain if the issue was decided in an
adversarial setting.
The use of the "totality" evaluation in this context creates a pre-
sumption that the waiver is valid. The judge must make the decision
whether to accept the waiver promptly with little background infor-
mation. Under these circumstances, a judge cannot determine
whether the juvenile fully understands the ramifications of the deci-
sion to proceed without counsel.146 The judge can deny only waiv-
ers ofjuveniles who suffer from obvious intellectual disabilities. For
example, if the juvenile does not understand the charges or that he is
entitled to a lawyer, the disability will be obvious. If the juvenile un-
derstands the right to an attorney, but believes that an attorney can-
not help because he is guilty, the misunderstanding would not be
noticed by the judge. 147 The judge's failure to perceive this misun-
derstanding would result in an invalid waiver.148 As a result, only
obvious invalid waivers are detected through the totality evaluation.
The present system presumes waivers are valid. Under this system it
is unlikely that a juvenile is capable of protecting his own interests in
juvenile court. Studies support this premise.14 9
Application of the totality rule to juvenile court waivers of counsel
is inappropriate. General rules are designed to protect the majority
interest at the expense of a few who are not in need of protection.150
145. See generally supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text.
146. See generally supra notes 117-47 and accompanying text. Thejudge can inform
the juvenile of the right to an attorney. If the juvenile does not understand the im-
portance of an attorney, or the legal protection behind the privilege against self-
incrimination, the waiver would be invalid. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying
text.
147. Grisso found this misconception pervasive among juveniles in his study. T.
GRIsso, supra note 10, at 124-30.
148. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464.
149. See supra notes 95-136 and accompanying text.
150. See Note, supra note 103, at 224. An example of this proposition is the re-
quirement that individuals arrested be given the Miranda warning. Statements made
in the absence of the warning should be per se inadmissible. Some arrestees do not
need to be given the warning. The law should presume the need for the warning,
however, to protect the majority of arrestees from errors caused by their ignorance.
Another example of the proposition at work is the law which makes contracts of
minors voidable. See generally J. CAtAmARI & J. Pmut.o, CoNTaAcrs § 8, at 231-33
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The totality test, in this context, is a general rule which fails to en-
sure protection required by the majority. The test's only virtues are
its cost and its simplicity.
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
Because the "totality" test does not guarantee that juveniles val-
idly waive their right to legal representation in court, an alternative
must be adopted. Alternatives to the totality test are costly and
would clog juvenile court calendars. If the objective is protection of
juveniles' constitutional rights, however, cost should not be the para-
mount concern.
One solution is to require that waivers of counsel be made only
after consulting with an attorney. This practice is followed in a
number ofjurisdictions.15, It is also followed in Hennepin County
with respect to juveniles charged with felonies.152 A lawyer is more
effective than a judge in informing the juvenile of the benefits of
counsel. An attorney recognizing a strong case against the juvenile
could negotiate a settlement on thejuvenile's behalf. The attorney is
in a position to advise the juvenile on the course of action that is in
the juvenile's best interests.
A system requiring an attorney to assist in the decision to waive
counsel strikes a balance between the current system and the adult
court requirement that counsel be present during trial even if not
requested. This proposal places discretion with the juvenile's attor-
ney, usually a public defender, to evaluate the merits of the case and
the severity of the penalty at risk.
A second approach to the waiver problem is advocated by the Min-
nesota Juvenile Code Revision Task Force. The Task Force drafted a
bill which was introduced in the Minnesota Legislature during the
1985 session.153 The bill, however, has not been enacted. The pro-
(discussing general policy considerations limiting the minor's right to contract).
Surely all minors are not intellectually incompetent to contract, but most contracts
made by a person under 18 years of age are voidable. The law presumes that minors
are incompetent in order to protect the majority of minors from errors caused by
their ignorance. Id. at 232.
151. See, e.g., State v. Doe, 95 N.M. 302, 304, 621 P.2d 519, 521 (N.M. Ct. App.
1980) (all children must be represented by counsel at least at the first appearance); In
re Dominick F., 74 A.D.2d 485, 486, 428 N.Y.S.2d 113, 114 (1980) (construing a state
statute that presumes juveniles do not have the requisite knowledge and maturity to
waive the right to counsel).
152. See Oleisky Interview, supra note 2.
153. The bill drafted by the Juvenile Code Revision Task Force was introduced
both in the Minnesota House and Senate. H.F. No. 774, S.F. No. 753, 74th Minn.
Leg., 1985 Sess. (copy on file at the William Mitchell Law Review Office) [hereinafter
cited as H.F. No. 774]. At the writing of this Note, the bill was being reviewed by the
House Committee on Crime and Family Law and the Senate Judiciary Committee.
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posed bill requires juveniles charged with delinquency to be repre-
sented by counsel at all stages of court proceedings, except under
limited circumstances.154 With this proposal, a juvenile could ask to
represent himself at any stage in the proceedings.155 The court,
however, must refuse ajuvenile's request to proceed pro se unless it
appears from a totality of the circumstances that the request is made
voluntarily and intelligently, and that the juvenile is competent to
represent himself.156
Notwithstanding the juvenile's decision to represent himself, the
court must designate counsel to be present at all hearings to assist
and counsel the juvenile.157 This proposal mirrors Rule 5 of the
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Prodecure.158 Thus, the proposal re-
quires appointed counsel even after a juvenile waives that right.
Although the proposal employs the "totality" evaluation, it shifts the
presumption. Rather than presume a valid waiver, as in the current
rule, this proposal presumes an invalid waiver.15 9 Before a judge ac-
cepts a waiver, he must find that the juvenile's waiver was made vol-
untarily, and that the juvenile is competent to represent himself. 160
See 1985 MINN. H.J. 566 (unbound supp.); 1985 MINN. SJ. 434 (unbound supp.).
Section 46 subdivision 4(b) of the proposed bill provides, "A child against whom a
delinquency petition has been filed must be represented by counsel at all stages of
the court proceedings, except as otherwise provided in subdivision 5." Id. H.F. No.
774, supra, § 46, subd. 4(b). Subdivision 5 of the proposed bill places the following
restrictions on a juvenile's right to pro se representation:
(a) A child against whom a delinquency petition has been filed may ask
that the court permit him or her to represent himself or herself at any or all
stages of the court proceedings. The court shall refuse the child's request to
proceed pro se unless it appears from the totality of the circumstances that
the request is made voluntarily and intelligently and that the child is compe-
tent to represent himself or herself.
(b) If a child chooses to represent himself or herself at court proceed-
ings and the court approves the child's request the court shall advise the
child on the record of the right to counsel at the beginning of each hearing
at which the child is not represented by counsel.
(c) Notwithstanding a child's decision to represent himself or herself at
the court's proceedings, the court shall designate counsel to be present at
all hearings to assist and consult with the child.
Id. at § 46, subd. 5.
154. H.F. No. 774, supra note 153, § 46, subd. 5(a).
155. Id.
156. Id. Subdivision 1 provides that the "'totality of circumstances' includes but
is not limited to the child's age, maturity, intelligence, education, experience, and
ability to comprehend, and the presence and competence of the child's parents,
guardian, or guardian ad litem." Id, subd. 1 (1).
157. Id, subd. (5)(a).
158. See supra note 3.
159. The proposed bill would require assessment of the waiver at each stage of
the proceedings. H.F. No. 774, supra note 153, § 46, subd. 5(b); see supra note 153
and accompanying text.
160. H.F. No. 774, supra note 153, § 46, subd. 5(b).
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The alternative proposals to the totality of circumstances test bet-
ter serve the juvenile's interests. The alternative proposals recog-
nize an adversarial relationship. In contrast, under the totality test,
courts were paternalistic and juveniles were encouraged to admit
wrongdoing. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has approved of the
adversarial approach. Gault rejected the position that a compro-
mised procedure is "in the interest of the juvenile." 161 As recently
as 1979, the United States Supreme Court in Fare v. Michael C. 162
restated its view that the arrest and trial of a juvenile is no less adver-
sarial than an adult's. The majority in Fare rejected the notion that a
probation officer's job was to represent the interests of the juve-
nile.163 The majority instead concluded that the probation officer
was in no position to represent the juvenile.164 The Court placed
heavy emphasis on the probation officer's duty to the state seeking to
prosecute the juvenile and on the probation officer as peace officer in
an adversarial system.165 In this respect, Fare echoes Gault in finding
that the juvenile justice system is an adversarial system in which
juveniles require the same constitutional protections afforded
adults. 166
The Minnesota State Planning Agency study,167 as well as the
Grisso168 and San Diego169 studies, conclude that uninformed waiv-
ers of the right to counsel by juveniles occur daily in Minnesota and
in other jurisdictions. The problem may be solved by the state legis-
lature by enacting an adversarial approach.
CONCLUSION
In Gault, the Supreme Court held that the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment entitles a juvenile to the right to ap-
161. Gault, 387 U.S. at 21-22.
162. 442 U.S. 707 (1978).
163. See id. at 721.
164. Id. at 722. Justice Powell agreed with this proposition but dissented for other
reasons. Id. at 732.
165. The Court stated the following regarding a probation officer's duty to the
state:
[I]t cannot be said that the probation officer is able to offer the type of in-
dependent advice that an accused would expect from a lawyer retained or
assigned to assist him during questioning. Indeed, the probation officer's
duty to his employer, in many, if not most, cases would conflict sharply with
the interests of the juvenile.
Id. at 721.
166. See T. GRISSO, supra note 10, at 207-10.
167. JUVENILE JUSTICE STUDY, supra note 1, at 18.
168. T. Giusso, supra note 10, at 210.
169. Researchers in the San Diego Study found that only five of 86 fourteen-year-
old subjects fully understood the constitutional rights read them in the Miranda warn-
ing. San Diego Study, supra note 10, at 53.
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pointed counsel in delinquency matters which may result in commit-
ment to a state institution.170 The Minnesota Legislature has
extended that right to all juveniles charged with delinquency or sta-
tus offenses.171 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has developed a
standard by which a waiver of a constitutional right must be judged.
The standard requires that such a waiver consitute an "intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." 17
2
Approximately forty-seven percent of the juveniles in Minnesota
who were charged with delinquency waived their right to counsel in
1983.173 This evidence indicates that juveniles are intellectually in-
competent to perform a waiver comporting with established consti-
tutional standards. Consequently, many juveniles in Minnesota
waive their right to counsel without fully understanding the ramifica-
tions of their decision.
Certain Minnesota counties have responded to this problem by in-
stituting policies which largely prevent uncounseled admissions by
juveniles. While these practices on an ad hoc basis are commendable,
the problem of invalid in-court waivers of the right to counsel is one
that must be dealt with on a statewide basis. The protection of con-
stitutional rights must not be left to the discretion of the various dis-
trict courts.
The appropriate solution to this problem is the legislation drafted
by the Juvenile Code Revision Task Force. The Task Force's legisla-
tion requires that counsel be present at all hearings on delinquency
matters. Even though the bill allows a juvenile to waive the right to
counsel and proceed to trial pro se, the bill requires that counsel be
present during all hearings to assist the juvenile.
The protections in the legislation eliminate the problem addressed
by this discussion, since the legislation requires representation by
counsel from the arraignment stage onward. Any decision to admit
an offense would be made with the assistance of counsel. No deci-
sion would be the product of "ignorance of rights or adolescent
fright, fantasy or despair."1 74
These procedures would undoubtedly increase the cost ofjuvenile
court operation in Minnesota. The protection of constitutional
rights, however, is an activity not subject to cost-benefit analysis.1
75
170. Id. at 41.
171. See supra note 50.
172. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464.
173. JUVENILE JUSTICE STUDY, supra note 1, at 17. The study did not include data
from Hennepin County.
174. Gault, 387 U.S. at 55.
175. In the area of fundamental rights, the Supreme Court has spoken directly to
the issue of cost benefit analysis as a justification of the abridgement of constitutional
rights. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Supreme Court directly
addressed an argument by the Connecticut State Welfare Board that a residency re-
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Constitutional protections must be observed. Thus, is the duty of
the Minnesota Legislature to enact legislation which prevents the un-
informed in-court waiver of legal counsel by juveniles. To be effec-
tive, that legislation should comport with the proposal endorsed
above.
Ross Quaintancet
quirement for receipt of welfare benefits was justified on fiscal grounds. Holding the
state statute unconstitutional as a violation of the right to interstate travel, the Court
stated:
We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integ-
rity of its programs. It may legitimately attempt to limit its expenditures,
whether for public assistance, public education or any other program. But a
state may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between
classes of citizens. . . . In the case before us, appellants must do more than
show that denying welfare to new residents saves money.
lId at 633. Right to counsel, where it applies, should be afforded the same type of
protection from abridgement on the basis of fiscal grounds.
t Ross Quaintance graduated from William Mitchell College of Law in June of
1985. While returning from a vacation in the Canadian Rockies, Ross was critically
injured in an automobile accident. He died eighteen days after the accident at the
age of 27.
The idea of dying after spending three grueling years in law school seems particu-
larly cruel. However, unlike many of us, Ross did not let law school get in the way of
his growth as a person. He will be missed, not only for the kind of person he was, but
for who he was going to be.
1985]
25
Quaintance: Waivers of Counsel in Juvenile Courts: Do Procedures Guard agains
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1986
26
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss1/3
